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Introduction 
 
Union density in Britain has fallen dramatically over the past twenty years (from nearly 60% 
in the early 1980s, to below 40% by the late 1990s).  This period of decline coincided not 
only with nearly two decades of Tory party rule, but more importantly, with the repeal of 
mandatory membership and due payment provisions in Britain.  Interestingly, though the 
repeal of mandatory membership seems to have precipitated (or at least coincided with) 
economy-wide falls in union density, changes in law do not seem to have affected union 
density differentials across groups of workers.  That is, membership rates have continued to 
differ markedly across age categories (young vs. old), industries (manufacturing vs. services), 
sectors (public vs. private), occupations (blue collar vs. professionals) and regions (north vs. 
south).  The question is why – if density decline was part of some general trend towards 
market equilibrium following the outlaw of compulsory membership provisions  – did 
differences in the probability of being a union member between these and other segments 
remain so substantial?  Indeed, why did the abandonment of the closed shop seemingly 
reduce the overall rate of unionization, but leave untouched differentials that existed prior to 
the legal changes described above?  
We approach these questions from the perspective of consumer choice theory 
(Lancaster, 1966).  In our case, employees choose between union and non-union forms of 
representation at work.  Employees also face switching costs when attempting to relinquish 
(acquire) union membership status.  In conventional product market models, switching costs 
can explain why consumers delay the purchase of goods with positive net benefits, and 
likewise, why they fail to stop purchasing technologies which may have grown obsolete 
(Klemperer, 1995).  We argue that these same modelling techniques helps us understand why 
certain workers fail to join (or leave) a union, despite possessing a latent a willingness to do 
so.  Empirically, the supply and demand framework of Farber and Krueger (1993) is 
employed to examine whether union density gaps across segments are due to differences in 
employee demand, or, to some form of switching cost.  In short, the framework can explain 
why density differentials between groups of workers do not dissipate automatically once 
compulsory membership provisions are eliminated. 
The data and methodology extend in four significant respects the supply-and-demand 
framework developed by Farber and Krueger (1993) and Riddell (1993) to analyse similar 
North-American differences in union density.  First, we note that in the past, the supply-and-2 
demand framework has been applied to unionization differentials arising either between 
sectors (public vs. private) or across countries (Canada vs. US).  Here we expand the number 
of segments using a rich set of socio-demographic, occupational, workplace, geographic, and 
attitudinal characteristics.  Second, instead of assuming that all union members have an 
unobserved desire for unionization which is positive, we assume that some workers prefer to 
abandon membership, and so we estimate the degree of ‘over-supply’ of unionization 
amongst members.  Third, we provide a justification for both frustrated demand and over-
supply that hinges on the presence of switching costs between union and non-union jobs.  The 
model, therefore, provides a rationale for the observed mismatch between actual and desired 
membership status on the part of certain employees.  Finally, this is the first paper that reports 
levels of frustrated demand and over-supply outside of North America. 
We begin our analysis by discussing the analytical and empirical frameworks 
employed.  This is followed by a presentation of the data drawn from the 1998 British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) and Workplace Employee Relations (WERS) surveys.  We then present our 
empirical section which answers five pertinent questions.  First, we track the observable 
‘purchase’ of unionisation (membership across segments over the period 1983-1998) to 
establish whether segmentation has risen or declined following the end of the closed shop.  
As part of this exercise we also measure how many worker segments exist.  Second, we 
estimate different demand schedules for unionization in order  to  measure the degree of 
frustrated demand for unionisation within each identifiable segment.  Segments with greater 
levels of frustrated demand are consistent with higher switching-in costs.  Third, potential 
rates of unionisation by segment are measured, based on the extent of over-supply and 
frustrated demand for union voice.  Fourth we identify which segments face the greatest 
switching-out costs by measuring the degree of union over-supply.  Finally, we decompose 
the largest segment differentials into demand and frustrated demand components in order to 
determine the causes of segmentation and to identify where employees face the greatest 
switching costs into and out of membership. 
 3 
1.  Analytical Framework 
 
1.1  Segmenting the market for unionization  
 
It is a well known phenomenon that in market settings with heterogeneous consumers, 
suppliers prefer to customise and price discriminate in order to capture all potential consumer 
and producer surplus (Varian, 2001).  The problem is that suppliers often lack sufficient 
information to tailor their marketing efforts on an individual basis, so they aim to 
discriminate amongst groups of buyers.  This is done by examining whether there is one or 
several sub-populations (segments) of consumers and then measuring the degree of demand 
heterogeneity between segments.  The marketing literature identifies a  segment as a 
significantly distinct group of buyers within a larger market (Lambin, 1997).   
If one applies the logic of segmentation to the process by which employees demand 
(and unions offer) membership status, a natural question is whether a similar kind of 
heterogeneity exists in the ‘market’ for membership?  In other words, do (or should) unions 
engage in the same kind of segmentation strategies as do firms operating in heterogeneous 
product markets?  In this paper we are primarily interested in whether the observed demand 
for unionization across employee segments is heterogeneous, and secondly, whether any 
existing segmentation is due to demand-side differences or to switching costs engendered by 
some form of supply-side constraint?  
 
1.2  Identifying market segments for ‘union’ voice 
 
The process of  market segmentation begins with an analysis of the diversity of customer 
demand.  In the marketing literature, groups of consumers are aggregated into segments in 
such a way that there is a maximum homogeneity of demand within segments and maximum 
heterogeneity between segments (Jagpal, 1999).  In this study, the measures used to capture 
demand for unionization include (i) the actual ‘purchase’ of unionization (e.g. observed union 
membership status) and (ii) several measures of the desire for union voice (which is typically 
unobserved in the data but where proxies for desired membership and/or representation can 
be used).  These measures are employed to estimate demand differentials across a spectrum 
of worker segments using the following five variable classifications: (i) socio-demographic 4 
characteristics; (ii) ideological orientation; (iii) occupation/job related characteristics; (iv) 
workplace/industry; and (v) geographic location.
1  
In order to identify whether segments are internally homogenous, we first look at 
differences in union density over different time periods.  Let 
c
jt U be the unconditional mean 
of union density within segment j (e.g. gender) with c categories a and b (i.e. male, female) at 
time t.  The observed union gap in density for workers i in segment j is: 
 
[1]                                                  
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A simple comparison of unconditional means allows us to identify whether demand within a 
given segment is significantly different from the overall average (i.e. the mean for the all-
worker population) and hence characteristic of an internally homogeneous segment.
2  
In order to identify whether selected socio-demographic and workplace related 
segments are heterogeneous with respect to each other, we look at the joint significance of 
parameter estimates for union membership across segments.  This is based on a standard 
multiple regression framework, which simultaneously controls for all segments and 
additional regressors capturing the extent of  product market competition and managerial 
orientation to unions among other things. 
 
1.3  Segmentation and the presence of switching costs 
 
The union membership segmentation model can be specified in the following way.  Adapting 
standard notation, let
3  
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and  
                                                 
1 The paper uses only ‘naturally occurring’ socio-demographic segments rather than those constructed from 
factor or latent class analysis.   
2 Equation (1) assumes that segments are dichotomous (e.g. gender) but they can be categorical as well, in which 
case the differences in density are measured against some assigned reference category. 
3 See specifications found in Riddell (1993) and Booth and Arulampalam (2000). 
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it t it it x y e b + = * ,     
where  * y  denotes the  ‘typically’ unobserved demand for union voice,
4  U is observed 
membership status, x is an observable vector of characteristics (including all segments j) 
which influence  * y ,b  is the vector of coefficients and e  is the unobservable error term.   
Most studies assume that membership status for an individual is observed only when 
the demand for unionization  * y  crosses a threshold – zero being typically the case (Booth 
and Arulampalam, 2000; Riddell, 1993).  In equation [2], we extend the framework to include 
the latent desire threshold d  and the switching-search cost threshold, q  where superscripts w 
and  e denote switching-out and switching-in costs respectively.  By designating a dual 
threshold, we are acknowledging that attempting to acquire or abandon membership is not a 
costless exercise, and that frustrated demand and over-supply of union membership are 
possible outcomes.  For example, positive membership status  ) 1 ( Pr = U ob can co-exist with 
an unobserved desire to relinquish membership  d < * y , so long as that desire remains below 
the switching-out cost incurred if one tries to abandon union membership,    *it
w y q d < > .  
Similarly, a positive desire for u nion voice  d > * y  may be coincident with non-union 
membership status  ) 0 ( Pr = U ob simply because the costs of becoming a member (i.e. the 
time to find a job in a unionised workplace, the hurdles imposed by an intransigent employer 
or even the payment of an initiation fee) are such that they prevent a worker from realizing 
their preferred (latent) choice, 
e
it y q d < < * .   
The coexistence of non-union or union membership in the presence of a latent desire 
to switch in or out of such status, is akin to the switching costs incurred by consumers in a 
number of product market settings (Klemperer, 1995).  In our case, the switching costs can 
relate to the effects of institutional regimes where employees are compelled to pay dues 
irrespective of their desire to be card carrying union members.
5    Or, alternatively, in 
institutional environments where no one can be forced to pay dues (such as in Britain) the 
costs relate to employer resistance and to the less often mentioned effects of procrastination 
(Rabin, 1998), social custom (Booth, 1985) and c o-worker conformity (Lazear, 1999).
6  
                                                 
4 We say, ‘typically’, because until relatively recently data sets where workers were asked their preference for 
unionisation were unavailable. 
5 Institutional regimes such as quasi-closed shop rules prevalent in most of the US and Canada prohibit 
individuals from opting out of the payment of union dues and hence ensure (de facto) union membership for all 
employees in unionised workplaces (i.e. no free riding).   
6 Booth and Arulampalm (2000) also provide a list of factors which contribute to the persistence of membership 
in the absence of formal coercion. 6 
Social custom and conformity impose social sanctions on individuals if they deviate from an 
agreed upon group norm.  Procrastination, on the other hand, can forestall (almost 
indefinitely) a decision which is beneficial (net of costs) for an individual to take.  In short, 
even when latent desire for unionization is above (below) the typical threshold of those who 
join a union, both procrastination and conformity can lead (almost indefinitely) to the 
persistence of non-union (union) membership status. 
 
 
2.  Empirical Framework:  the Demand and Supply for Union Membership 
 
The supply and demand framework of collective representation (Farber and Krueger, 1993; 
Riddell, 1993; Abowd and Farber, 1982) is a useful approach for analysing the sources of 
union membership differentials between groups  – especially when unionization is not a 
statutory right, but has to be achieved through workplace organising.  With the introduction 
of switching costs into the supply and demand framework, the categories into which union 
and non-union workers fall into, change slightly.  Unionised employees in our formulation 
are composed of those who prefer to remain union members plus those who wish to switch 
out but do not, simply because the costs associated with abandoning membership are too 
high.  Likewise, non-union workers include those who prefer to remain non-union plus those 
who desire unionisation, but who are unable to switch into a union job because they are either 
not hired by a union employer, or because they procrastinate and/or conform to the anti-union 
sentiments of fellow co-workers.  Below we measure the proportion of British workers 
residing in each of these four categories. 
 
2.1  Frustrated demand and over-supply of union voice within segments
7 
 
The total demand for unionization in any given segment can be defined as the fraction of 
workers who prefer unionization.  This fraction, as stated above, includes union members 
who wish to remain unionised and non-union workers who desire union voice.  One can also 
think of this as being the potential or equilibrium rate of unionization if latent demand for 
union membership were realised.  Formally a probability statement for  total 
demand ) 1 ( Pr * = = D ob y  is the following:  
                                                 
7 The following presentation borrows from Riddell (1993).  See Farber (1990) for an earlier treatm ent. 7 
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D is a dichotomous measure of the demand for unionization that equals one if worker i in 
segment j desires union voice and is zero otherwise.  Equation [3] identifies the three broad 
segments that make up total demand for unionization.  The first are employees who 
‘purchase’ union membership willingly.  Added to this is the frustrated segment, designated 
as the fraction of workers who desire unionisation    *ij d > y but who are non-union members 
because of some positive cost associated with switching into union status.  The third and final 
segment is the unsatisfied union member, designated as the fraction of workers who actually 
prefer to switch-out of unionization, but who remain unionised simply because the cost 
associated with abandoning membership, or switching-into a new form of non-union status, is 
too high.  We will refer to these last two terms as  frustrated demand and oversupply of 
unionization.
8  
  Note that if we rearrange terms, the probability of any given worker in segment j 
being unionised can be written as: 
 
[4]       )] 1 , 0 ( Pr ) 0 , 1 ( [Pr ) 1 ( Pr ) 1 ( Pr = = - = = - = = = ij ij ij ij ij ij U D ob U D ob D ob U ob . 
 
The first term on the right-hand-side represents the potential demand for union voice, while 
the second is the difference between frustrated demand and over-supply of unionization. 
 
                                                 
8 The frustrated demand and oversupply  fractions are derived from:   ) 0 ( Pr ) 0 1 ( Pr = ￿ = = ij U ob ij U ij D ob  and 
) 1 ( Pr ) 1 0 ( Pr = ￿ = = ij U ob ij U ij D ob , respectively. 
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2.2  Decomposing differences in observed union demand within segments 
 
The demand and supply framework presented above is useful in evaluating competing 
explanations for differences in unionization rates across segments.  Consider the age 
comparison between youth and adults.  One argument for the well known finding of a lower 
rate of u nionization amongst youth, is that young workers are less favourably disposed 
toward collective action, so that the demand for unionization will be lower amongst youth 
than adults.  An alternative view is that unions have not done a good job of organizing the 
young, perhaps due to median voter effects, where unions have to cater to the preferences of 
the median worker who tends to be older.  To the extent that these organizing deficits make it 
more difficult for young workers to acquire union voice, there will be less relative supply and 
more frustrated demand for union representation amongst youth than adults, even if overall 
demand is the same for both groups.
9  
Following Farber (1990) and Riddell (1993) we can define the relative supply of 
union voice within a given segment as  ) 1 1 ( Pr = = D U ob , which measures the ease of 
obtaining union voice given that a worker desires unionization.  The higher the probability 
the less support there is for a switching cost explanation of union membership differentials.   
General segment differences in the probability of unionization can also be 
decomposed more formally as follows: 
 
[5]                            ) 0 , 1 ( Pr ) 1 ( Pr ) 1 ( Pr = = D - = D = = D
c
j
c
j
c
j
c
j U D ob D ob U ob  
 
where the subscript j refers to the worker segment and the superscript c refers to mutually 
exclusive segment categories such as those found within gender and other dichotomous 
segments.
10 The term in the first brackets measures the difference in demand for unionization 
between segments of  workers, while the term in the second brackets measures differences in 
frustrated demand between segments. 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Blanden and Machin (2002) for more on the dynamics of youth-adult union membership.   
10 As in Farber and Krueger (1993) we have dropped the individual i in this probability statement since these 
probabilities actually represent segment (group) averages.  In the case of non-naturally occurring dichotomies 
we decompose differentials against some obvious reference category. 
? Frustrated Demand     ?  Demand 9 
3.  Data and Measures 
 
This paper uses data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and the 
British Social Attitudes Survey Series (BSA) for the period 1983-1998.  WERS is a linked 
employer-employee data set, which when weighted to account for complex survey design, 
provides a nationally representative sample of individuals employed in workplaces with ten 
or more employees.
11  Self-completion questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of 
25 employees (or all employees in workplaces with 10-24) in the 1880 cases where 
management permitted it.  Of the 44,283 questionnaires distributed, 28,237 (64%) were 
returned.
12  To these data we match workplace information obtained via management 
interviews, conducted face-to-face with the most senior employee relations manager.  This 
was supplemented by a pre-interview questionnaire providing workforce data that in some 
cases involved interrogating records.  Interviews were conducted in 2,191 workplaces with a 
response rate of 80%. 
BSA yields a representative sample of adults aged 18+ living in private households.
13 
The survey has been conducted annually since 1983 (with exceptions in 1988 and 1992) and 
achieves a response rate of 60% or more on average.  Our full data set comprises almost 
17,000 employees.  The majority of our BSA analysis is based on the 1998 survey and is 
restricted to employees working at least ten hours per week.  Once weighting to account for 
complex survey design  is undertaken, results can be generalised with confidence to the 
population of employees in Britain working at least 10 hours per week.  Most of the data are 
collected through face-to-face interviews, supplemented by self-completion questionnaires. 
 
3.1  Measures of observed and desired union status  
 
The BSA – which is one of the longest running surveys tracking unionization in Britain – 
identifies individual union membership status with the question: ‘Are you now a member of a 
trade union or staff association?’  WERS – along with asking a similarly worded membership 
status question as BSA – also asks all employees: ‘Ideally, who do you think would best 
represent you in dealing with managers here about the following issues….getting increases in 
                                                 
11 For further information on the survey’s design see Cully et al (1999). 
12 The weighting scheme used in this paper compensates for sample non-response bias which was detected in the 
employee survey (Airey et al., 1999:  91-92). 
13 See Jowell et al (1999) for details. 10 
my pay?….if I wanted to make a complaint about working here?…if a manager wanted to 
discipline me?’  Respondents are asked to choose between four options: ‘myself’, ‘trade 
union’, ‘another employee’, ‘somebody else’.  Where respondents identify the union as their 
preferred option in one or more cases, we say the employee desires unionization.
14  This, of 
course, covers but a single attribute of union demand (i.e. desired union representation) and 
should only be interpreted as an indirect measure of the demand for membership.  Despite the 
fact that desired union representation and desired membership should not be conflated, the 
two are highly correlated, and in this paper we group them with the understanding that they 
are similar (though not identical) measures of the desire for unionization.   
Table 1 presents data on desire for unionization in 1998 using WERS data.  Column 1 
of Table 1 shows that half (0.50) of all workers in establishments with 10 or more employees 
ideally wanted union representation on pay, grievances or disciplinary matters.  If the market 
for union membership was in equilibrium, then membership figures would approximate 
preferences, such that workers would be getting what they want.  In fact, the demand for 
unionization is 11 percentage points higher than the membership rate of 39% in WERS, 
indicating a sizeable level of frustrated demand for unionization in Britain.  Row 2 also 
shows the high satisfaction with unionization among existing members (i.e. 87% still desire 
representation). 
A different measure of desired unionization than the one found in WERS 1998 
(column 2 Table 1 last row) is based on the BSA, which asks employees in workplaces 
without a recognised union or staff association:    ‘If there were a trade union at your 
workplace, how likely or unlikely do you think you would be to join it?’  Answers range from 
‘very likely’ to ‘not at all likely’.  For non-members in non-unionised workplaces 39% said 
they would be ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ likely to join, including 14% who said ‘very likely’.  At the 
end of a sustained period of union decline, the BSA and WERS figures demonstrate the 
substantial amount of frustrated demand for unionization in Britain (see Charlwood, 2001). 
 
                                                 
14 Where data were missing on one or more of the three items, observations were dropped from analysis. 11 
4.  Analysis 
 
4.1  Is the market for unionization segmented? 
 
In order to evaluate heterogeneity in the demand for union voice, we begin with the 
unconditional difference-in-means approach outlined in equation [1].  Table 2 illustrates the 
application of this formula to BSA data from 1983 to 1998.
15    It shows that across all 
segments, a general decline in the observed purchase of union membership occurred between 
1983 and 1998.  
16 However, substantial segmentation persists.   
Most union density differentials 
c
jt U D  greater than .06 proved significant at the .01 
level.  Using this criterion, only two segments displayed a convergence in union density rates.  
These segments – which in the parlance of marketing theory are said to have ‘disappeared’ – 
are ethnicity and manual/non-manual workers (see Figure 1a).
17  By way of contrast, across 
all other segments, the observed purchase of union voice persisted and for certain segments 
the gap widened.
18  Figure 1b, shows the youth-adult membership differential rising form 
0.12 in 1983-85 to 0.18 in 1995-1998.
19  Table 3 highlights, in descending order, the six most 
segmented categories in 1998 (i.e. where 
c
jt U D ranged between 0.57 and 0.16).   
In order to confirm the existence of a segmented (heterogeneous) market for union 
voice, segments were also entered into a multivariate model of union membership 
determination (available upon request).  Over several specifications, gender and ethnicity 
both proved insignificant as independent segments, and workplace size (which had one of the 
largest mean differentials) displayed coefficients that were much smaller in the multivariate 
setting.  In general, however, the conditional means are congruent with the findings found in 
Table 2. 
                                                 
15 We have grouped membership rates across segments using three-to-four year averages so as to smooth out 
year-to-year fluctuations. 
16 For useful summaries of the British over-time theory and evidence see Charlwood (2001); Metcalf (2001); 
Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000); Disney, Gosling, Machin and McCrae (1998) and Beaumont and Harris 
(1995). 
17 Both ethnicity and manual-non-manual are broad segments.  More desegregated categories based on these 
segment classifications (as those found in WERS) actually show considerable heterogeneity across ethnic 
groups and occupations. 
18 The BSA figures for 1989 onwards correspond very closely to those obtained using the Labour Force Survey 
(Hicks, 2000) although there is small increase in membership in BSA between 1990 and 1991 which is not 
apparent in the LFS. 
19 A panel approach used by Disney et al (1998) corroborates these findings. 12 
In summary, Tables 2 and 3 show that despite the outlawing of compulsory union 
membership and a 20 year decline in economy-wide union density, substantial segmentation 
in the market for unionisation still exists.  In particular, the observed ‘purchase’ of 
unionisation was found to be segmented by age, education, earnings, tenure, part-
time/fulltime status, sector (public/private), workplace union recognition, manufacturing/non-
manufacturing, workplace size, region, and ideological orientation.  Below we move to the 
determination of these differentials, as viewed from the perspective of the supply-demand 
framework and our switching cost approach. 
 
4.2  Where is potential demand for unionization greatest? 
 
Appendix Table A1 displays observed and desired unionization rates drawn from WERS for 
all observed segments of the population of British workers employed in establishments with 
10 or more employees.  The WERS segments – which conform as much as possible to the 
BSA segments in Table 2 – display a pattern similar to that of the 1998 BSA, but with some 
significant differences in segments such as gender.
20  Table A1 essentially answers most of 
the questions posed in our empirical framework (Section 2), beginning with the most 
important from a union organizing point of view: ‘where is total (or potential) demand for 
unionization greatest?’
21  
The answer is summarised in Table 4.  The table confirms that demand is highest 
within traditional zones of union strength such as the public sector, amongst highly 
experienced workers and within large establishments.  Changes to the law during the early 
1980s and early 1990s prohibiting mandatory membership and due payments, do not seem to 
have lowered switching-out costs enough so as to erode the strength of demand in these 
segments.  This could also indicate that unions have done a good job of attracting workers 
into these segments (perhaps by providing the optimal level of benefits) and ‘locking-them-
in’ once they have joined (perhaps by making the switch out of membership rather costly). 
 
                                                 
20 In order to be confident that our estimates can be generalised to the entire population of British workers 
employed in establishments with greater than 10 employees, 1998 WERS data was compared to Autumn 1997 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) data (Sept 97-Nov 98).  The comparison of union membership rates with LFS data 
was undertaken for employees in similarly-defined workplaces (11 or more employees) and they coincide with 
the patterns shown in the WERS98 data. 
21 Table A1 shows observed unionization rates (column 1), total demand (column 2), satisfied demand (column 
3), unmet demand (column 4), relative supply (column 5), frustrated demand (column 6), and over-supply of 
unionization (column 7) across segments.   13 
4.3  Where is frustrated demand for unionization greatest and why? 
 
A key variable to compare between segments is the fraction of non-union members who 
desire union voice  ) 0 , 1 ( Pr = = c
j U c
j D ob , which is denoted as frustrated demand.  This fraction 
is the product of unmet demand multiplied by the proportion of non-union workers, 
) 0 ( Pr ) 0 1 ( Pr = ￿ = = ij U ob ij U ij D ob .  Figure 2 (panels a and b) demonstrates the largest 
within segment differentials in frustrated demand found in Table A1 column 6.  The panels 
show that low-pay and low-tenure worker segments have the greatest levels of frustrated 
demand (0.23 and 0.21 respectively), as compared to their high pay/high tenure counterparts 
(0.04 and 0.09).  The panels can be interpreted in another way as well.  Switching costs out of 
non-union status (or into membership) are higher amongst the most disadvantaged segments 
of the workforce.  Those in the upper tails of the distribution are able to sort themselves into 
or out of membership with little apparent difficulty, as evidenced by the relatively low levels 
of frustrated demand –  ) 0 , 1 ( Pr = = c
j U c
j D ob  – in these segments. 
In Tables 5a and 5b, we split the unmet and frustrated demand components amongst 
individual and workplace segments with the highest levels of unmet demand, 
) 0 1 ( Pr = = ij U ij D ob .  Comparing the two tables, one notices that dispersion (see s in last 
row) in unionization and unmet demand (columns 1 and 2) is greater across workplace 
segments as compared to individual segments, whereas the variance in frustrated demand 
(column 3) is much less than that of individual segments (sw < sI).  The reason for this can be 
seen by looking across columns 1 and 2 in Tables 5a and 5b.  At the workplace level, where 
non-union membership is high the desire for unionization is low; both are inversely related 
and therefore offset each other and produce roughly equal levels of frustrated demand.   
Several potential explanations for this inverse relationship are plausible.  First, a 
mixture of bandwagon effects and co-worker sanctions may be operative at the workplace 
level.  Second, since the benefits derived from union voice rise with bargaining power, 
unionization can be said to display the features of a network-good with positive externalities.  
This also confirms that non-union members value union voice more highly where they see 
benefits accruing to co-workers, so that in workplaces where there is high density and 14 
recognition, one would also predict an ‘easier’ (albeit lower) organizing potential for unions 
(Metcalf, 2001).
22 
  What applications might these findings have?  At the level of union organizing, the 
implications are somewhat equivocal.  If one focuses on individual segments in Table 5a, the 
question is whether unions should target segments with the highest levels of frustrated 
demand such as youth and minorities.  Big gains appear possible, but at what cost since it 
appears that switching out of non-union status is hard in these individual segments?  
Segmentation on the basis of workplace characteristics raises a similar dilemma.  There 
appear to be sizable pockets of unmet demand, but where this demand among non-union 
members is still in the minority (such as in wholesale/retail trade) should a union risk costly 
organizing efforts if the likelihood of meeting employer and anti-union co-worker resistance 
is high?  Perhaps, unions would be better off directing their membership activity to segments 
where rates are already high, and hence where the likelihood of encountering workers with 
high switching costs out of non-union status would be low.  According to Metcalf if unions 
were to go down this so-called ‘in-fill’ route, their membership roles could potentially rise by 
some 2.2 million workers. 
 
4.4  Where is the relative supply of union membership greatest? 
 
Three columns in Table A1 are relevant when discussing the relative supply of unionization.  
First, column 3 shows the degree of satisfaction with union voice amongst members.  Column 
5 shows the probability of being unionised conditional on desiring union voice.  Column 7, is 
the inverse of column 3, and thus can be interpreted as the extent of over-representation of 
unionization.   
Following Farber (1990), one interpretation of relative supply,  ) 1 1 ( Pr = = D U ob  in 
column 5, is that this represents the ‘ease’ of acquiring union voice given that a worker 
desires such voice.  The overall ease of gaining membership is 0.69.  Segments displaying a 
higher than average supply of union voice (or in our framework, segments displaying the 
lowest switching costs into membership) seem to be those where workers have relatively 
more bargaining power.  These segments include (1) high pay workers; (2) professional 
                                                 
22 Although this does not offer an explanation for the inverse relationship between non-unionization and desire, 
the segment with the largest level of frustrated demand is wholesale and retail trade.  This was one of the fastest 
growing industries over the past decade, implying that industry growth is perhaps an important underlying 
variable influencing the degree of frustrated demand for unionization across industries. 
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workers; (3) craft and skilled workers; (4) adult workers; and (5) workers in the public sector 
(where presumably labour supply is keen input in the provision of public services). 
 
4.5  Where is the oversupply of unionization highest? 
 
Columns 3 and 7 of Table A1 display the high levels of overall satisfaction with unionisation 
amongst members.  There are very few segments with less than 0.75 of union members 
wishing to remain unionised.  Table 6 column 1 displays segments with above average levels 
of member dissatisfaction with union voice.  These can be interpreted, in our case, as 
segments where switching costs out of membership are highest.  Interestingly, as can be seen 
if we compare column 2 in Table 6 to Tables 5a and 5b, many of the segments with high 
levels of frustrated demand also display high levels of over-supply.  It appears that among the 
least powerful labour market segments, unions have not been able to keep existing members 
satisfied, nor have they done a good job recruiting non-members desiring union voice.  These 
findings are indicative of a ‘standardized’ counter-segmentation strategy employed by unions 
to attract members, whereby organized labour – because of its collective and democratic 
traditions – is still providing a collective service which is tailored to the ‘median’ union voter 
(who is often in a more privileged labour market position), rather than to the disadvantaged 
‘tails’ of the distribution. 
 
4.6  Decomposing observed union membership differentials    
 
Differentials in observed union membership status within segment categories can be 
decomposed using equation [5].  In Table 7 we decompose the largest union membership 
differentials identified in Table 2.  For illustrative purposes, we show how this decomposition 
was conducted for the age segment, thus allowing readers to do the same for any other 
‘differential’ of interest.  In 1998 the difference in union density between adults and youths 
employed in workplaces with 10 or more employees (Table A1 column 1) was 28 points (= 
43% - 15%).
23 
  If we take our adult estimate of unmet demand at face value, then 
) 0 , 1 ( Pr
25 25 = =
+ +
age age U D ob  = 0.25 (1 - 0.43) = 0.14.  The corresponding figure for young workers 
                                                 
23 This differential is almost identical to the LFS gap.  The LFS density rates are lower than those reported in 
WERS because the LFS is representative of all employees including those in establishments with less than 10 
workers where the density rate is lowest.   16 
is  ) 0 , 1 ( Pr
25 25 = =
< <
age age U D ob = 0.26 (1 –0.15) = 0.22.  This tells us that roughly 8 points of the 28 
point youth-adult gap is attributable to differences in frustrated demand, perhaps due to the 
difficulty unions have in organizing the young and the malleability of youth when confronted 
by managers and co-workers with anti-union biases.  The remaining 20 points are attributable 
to greater adult worker demand for unionization.  In other words, 29 percent of the adult-
youth gap in the observed purchase of union voice is attributable to switching costs (supply-
side constraints) and 71 percent is attributable to demand-side differences.   
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper borrows concepts from the theory of consumer choice in order to model 
segmentation and the desire for unionization.  In the m odel, employees incur costs when 
attempting to switch into or out of union membership status, just as they would in certain 
product market settings when switching between particular brands or goods involves risk and 
potential loss of quality.  Switching costs can explain why some employees favor 
unionization but fail to become members, and why some individuals continue to pay their 
dues even though they wish to relinquish their membership.  The switching cost model also 
predicts that differences in union membership between segments will persist even when 
obligatory membership provisions are eliminated and overall density declines.  
In keeping with these predictions, we find that density differentials in Britain have 
persisted (and in some cases widened) across most segments even as overall membership 
rates have fallen, with convergence only occurring in two segments (manual/non-manual and 
ethnicity).  We also find that total demand for unionization is highest (and oversupply lowest) 
in segments of traditional union strength such as among high tenure and public sector 
workers and in certain geographical centres, suggesting that differentials across these 
segments are due to preferences rather than to switching costs. 
In decomposing the causes for the gap between desired and actual unionization by 
segment, we found that frustrated demand for unionization plays an important (though not a 
majority) role and that ‘oversupply’ of unionization to members was much less apparent.  For 
the economy as a whole, when one factors the proportion of both frustrated and oversupplied 
workers, the potential rate of unionization in Britain is 11 percentage points higher than is 
currently observed. 17 
The results illustrate the degree to which labour markets may be under-supplying 
union voice to workers in Britain, not only because of employer opposition, but because of 
more general switching costs associated with social custom, conformity and procrastination.  
Though the declines in union density seen since the early 1980s may very well have been 
caused by shifts in employee demand, the fact that half of all current workers in Britain say 
that they prefer unionisation over other forms of representation, indicates that observable 
membership rates are ‘underreporting’ the extent to which  workers would choose 
membership if they were able to organize workplaces free of the costs imposed by switching 
status or the social pressures encountered from co-workers and managers. 18 
Table 1:  Proportion of Workers Who Desire Union Membership in Britain 
 
Measures  WERS 1998  BSA 1998 
  [1]  [2] 
All Workers     
Prob[U=1]  0.39  - 
Prob[D=1]  0.50  - 
Union Members      
Prob[D=1|U=1]  0.87  - 
Non Members     
Prob[D=1| U=0]  0.25  0.39 
 
Notes:  D=desired unionisation; U=union status; [1] Derived variable based on the desire for 
union representation (see Section 3.1).  [2] Based on the question “Would you join a union?”19 
Table 2:  Union Membership and Differentials as a Proportion 
of the Workforce Across Segments
* 
 
Segment  Segment Category  1983-85  1986-89  1990-94  1995-98
† 
    [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
  All Workers  0.48  0.45  0.41  0.35 
Gender  Male  0.52  0.49  0.45  0.38 
  Female  0.42  0.40  0.37  0.32 
  D   0.10  0.09  0.08  0.06*** 
Ethnicity  White  0.48  0.45  0.40  0.35 
  Non-white  0.50  0.43  0.43  0.39 
  D   -0.02  0.02  -0.03  -0.04 
Age  Adult  (age 25+)  0.50  0.48  0.43  0.37 
  Youth (< 25 age)  0.38  0.34  0.27  0.19 
  D   0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18*** 
Education  1.Higher education  0.48  0.49  0.50  0.43 
  2.Middle education  0.44  0.43  0.37  0.30 
  3.Low education  0.49  0.45  0.37  0.30 
  D [1]-[2]  0.04  0.07  0.12  0.13*** 
  D [1]-[3]  -0.01  0.05  0.13  0.13*** 
Occupation  Non-manual  0.43  0.41  0.39  0.34 
  Manual  0.54  0.51  0.44  0.36 
  D   -0.11  -0.10  -0.05  -0.02 
Earnings  1.Low earner  0.36  0.34  0.28  0.22 
  2.Middle earner  0.57  0.52  0.49  0.39 
  3.High earner  0.55  0.54  0.51  0.45 
  D [1]-[2]  -0.21  -0.18  -0.21  -0.17*** 
  D [1]-[3]  -0.19  -0.19  -0.23  -0.23*** 
Tenure  Job tenure > 5  N/A  N/A  0.53  0.47 
  Job tenure < 5  N/A  N/A  0.28  0.21 
  D   N/A  N/A  0.25  0.27*** 
Employment Status  Part time  0.27  0.32  0.28  0.26 
  Full time  0.52  0.48  0.44  0.37 
  D   -0.25  -0.16  -0.16  -0.12*** 
Sector  1.  Private  0.30  0.31  0.28  0.23 
  2.  Public  0.77  0.73  0.68  0.62 
  3.  Other  0.27  0.36  0.35  0.26 
  D [1]-[2]  -0.47  -0.41  -0.40  -0.39*** 
  D [1]-[3]  0.03  -0.05  -0.07  -0.04 
Industry (Private)  Non-manufacturing   0.21  0.22  0.22  0.18 
  Manufacturing   0.42  0.46  0.40  0.33 
  D  -0.21  -0.24  -0.18  -0.15*** 
Union Recognition  No union recognised  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.06 
  Union recognition  0.72  0.72  0.69  0.63 
  D  -0.66  -0.67  -0.64  -0.57*** 
Workplace Size  1.  Under 10 employees  0.17  0.21  0.15  0.13 
  2.  10 to 24 empl.  0.32  0.35  0.30  0.27 
  3.  25 to 99 empl.  0.48  0.42  0.43  0.33 
  4.  100 to  499 empl.  0.59  0.56  0.50  0.43 
  5.  500 + empl.  0.69  0.68  0.61  0.51 
  D [5]-[1]  0.52  0.47  0.46  0.38*** 
  D [5]-[2]  0.37  0.33  0.31  0.24*** 
  D [5]-[3]  0.21  0.26  0.18  0.18*** 
  D [5]-[4]  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.08** 
Region  1.Scotland and Wales  0.59  0.57  0.49  0.45 
  2.  North and Midlands  0.54  0.50  0.46  0.38 
  3.  South  0.39  0.36  0.34  0.29 
  D [1]-[2]  0.05  0.07  0.03  0.07** 
  D [1]-[3]  0.20  0.21  0.15  0.16*** 
Ideological  1.  Left of centre  0.53  0.53  0.48  0.44 
Orientation  2.  Moderate  N/A  0.49  0.43  0.37 
  3.  Right of centre  0.42  0.36  0.35  0.28 
  D [1-2]  N/A  0.04  0.05  0.07 
  D [1-3]  0.11  0.18  0.13  0.16*** 
 
*Notes:  Based on samples derived from various waves of BSA 1983-1998.  Samples include 
individuals who are not self-employed and who worked more than 10hrs on average in the 
week prior to the survey.  † End of period (1995-98) union membership differentials 
significant at 0.01 at 0.05 levels denoted by *** and ** respectively. 20 
Table 3:  Largest Within-Segment Union Membership Differentials in Britain:  1995-98 
 
 
Segment Category 
Observed 
Demand 
Pr(U
a=1) 
[1]
 
Observed 
Demand 
Pr(U
b=1) 
[2] 
Unionization
Differential 
DU=1 
[3] 
1.  Recognised 
a vs. non-recognised 
b  0.63  0.06  0.57 
2.  Large
 a vs. small workplaces 
b  0.51  0.13  0.38 
3.  Long
 a vs. short tenure 
b  0.47  0.21  0.26 
4.  High
 a  vs. low earners 
b  0.45  0.22  0.23 
5.  Adult
 a vs. youth 
b  0.37  0.19  0.18 
6.  Scotland/Wales
 a vs. South 
b  0.45  0.29  0.16 
 
Note:  Superscripts a and b denote segment categories.   
 
Source:  BSA 1995-1998.  See Table 1 for underlying data. 
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Table 4:  Segments With the Greatest Total Demand for Unionization in Britain:  1998 
 
 
Segment Category 
Total Demand  
Pr(D=1) 
Observed Demand 
Pr(U=1) 
  [1]  [2] 
All Workers  0.50  0.39 
1.  Electricity, gas and water  0.75  0.72 
2.  Public Sector  0.72  0.62 
3.  Transport and communication  0.69  0.62 
4.  Large workplace (500+ emp.  )  0.67  0.57 
5.  Operative and Assembly  0.66  0.55 
6.  Northern Britain  0.65  0.57 
7.  Health   0.60  0.48 
8.  Scotland  0.59  0.48 
9.  Wales  0.59  0.45 
10.  Age of establishment (20+ yr)  0.57  0.48 
11.  Ethnic (Non-White)  0.57  0.42 
12.  Middle wage earners  0.57  0.47 
13.  Age (40-49 yrs)  0.56  0.48 
14.  Job tenure (5+ yrs)  0.55  0.46 
 
Note:  See Table A1 for underlying data. 
 
Source:  WERS 1998.  See Table A1 for underlying data. 
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Table 5a:  Unmet and Frustrated Demand for Unionization in Individual Segments 
 
 
 
Segment 
 
 
Segment Category 
Non-union 
Pr(U=0) 
[1] 
Unmet demand 
Pr(D=1 | U=0) 
[2] 
Frustrated demand 
Pr(D=1,U=0) 
[3] 
  All workers  .61  .25  .15 
Age  25+  .57  .25  .14 
  <25  .85  .26  .22 
Ethnicity  White  .61  .25  .15 
  Non-white  .58  .35  .20 
Occupation  Manager  .74  .11  .08 
  Sales  .82  .29  .24 
Pay level  Low pay (<£181pw)  .80  .28  .22 
  High pay (£361pw+)  .55  .13  .07 
Tenure  <2yrs  .79  .26  .21 
  10+yrs  .40  .22  .09 
  Standard Dev.  ( si )  s = 0.15  s = 0.07  s = 0.06  
 
Note:  Category proportions may not necessarily represent the weighted all-worker total 
because these are selected from the total category segments found in Table A1.Column 
[3]=[1]x[2]. 
 
Source:  WERS 1998.  See Table A1 for underlying data.23 
Table 5b:  Unmet and Frustrated Demand for Unionization in Workplace Segments 
 
 
 
Segment 
 
 
Segment Category 
Non-union  
Pr(U=0) 
[1] 
Unmet demand 
Pr(D=1 | U=0) 
[2] 
Frustrated demand 
Pr(D=1,U=0) 
[3] 
  All workers  .61  .25  .15 
Type  Non-independent  .56  .28  .16 
  Independent  .80  .18  .14 
Size  10-24 employees  .78  .18  .14 
  500+ employees  .43  .34  .15 
Sector  Private  .71  .21  .15 
  Public  .38  .42  .16 
Industry  Elec/Gas/Water  .28  .37  .10 
  Wholesale/Retail  .83  .26  .22 
Unionization  No recognition  .91  .18  .16 
  Union recognition  .39  .37  .14 
  Standard Dev.  (sw 
)  
s = 0.21  s = 0.09  s = 0.03  
 
Note:  Category proportions may not necessarily represent the weighted all-worker total 
because these are selected from the total category segments found in Table A1.  Column 
[3]=[1]x[2]. 
 
Source:  WERS 1998.  See Table A1 for underlying data. 
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Table 6:  ‘Over-Supply’ of Unionization by Segment:  Britain 1998 
 
  Over-representation  Oversupply 
Segment Category  Pr(D=0|U=1)  Pr(D=0, U=1) 
  [1]  [2] 
All Workers  0.13  0.05 
1.  Hotel and Restaurant   0.34  0.03 
2.  Low Pay (<£50pw)  0.34  0.03 
3.  High Pay (£681+pw)  0.29  0.08 
4.  Managers  0.24  0.06 
5.  Single Ind.  Workplace  0.24  0.05 
6.  Small Workplaces   0.20  0.04 
7.  Youth  0.19  0.03 
8.  Low tenure  0.18  0.04 
 
Note:  Column 2 is calculated by the following formula from Table A1:  Column [7] 
multiplied by [1 –[1]]. 
 
Source:  WERS 1998.  See Table A1 for underlying data. 
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Table 7:  Decomposing Largest Union Membership Differentials in Britain:  1998 
 
 
 
Segment Category 
Unionisation 
Differential
 
Total 
Demand 
Component 
Frustrated 
Demand 
Component 
  DU=1  Pr(D=1)  Pr(D=1,U=0) 
Electricity/Gas/Water vs. Wholesale 
Retail 
0.55 
(100) 
0.43 
(81) 
0.12 
(19) 
Recognised vs. non-recognised  0.52 
(100) 
0.50 
(96) 
0.02 
(4) 
Long vs. short tenure  0.39 
(100) 
0.27 
(69) 
0.12 
(21) 
Large vs. small workplaces  0.35 
(100) 
0.36 
(100) 
-0.01 
(0) 
Adult vs. youth  0.28 
(100) 
0.20 
(71) 
0.08 
(29) 
High  vs. low earners  0.25 
(100) 
0.10 
(40) 
0.15 
(60) 
Scotland/Wales vs. South East*   0.22 
(100) 
0.21 
(95) 
0.01 
(5) 
 
Note:  Representative of all workplaces with 10+ employees.  Proportion of total differential 
in ( ).  * Not including London. 
 
Source:  WERS 1998.  See Table A1 for underlying data.  26 
Figure 1:  Examples of Convergence and Divergence in Unionization Across Segments 
 
a.  Manual vs. Non-manual       
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b.  Youth vs. Adult 
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Notes:  See Table 2 for underlying data. 
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Figure 2:  Largest Differentials in Frustrated Demand Across Segments 
 
Figure 2a: Frustrated Demand by Segment (Income)
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Figure 2b: Frustrated Demand by Segment (Tenure)
Segmentation by Tenure (yrs)
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Notes:  See Table A1 column 6 for underlying data. 
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Table A1:  Relative Supply and Frustrated Demand for Unionization in Britain 1998 
  U=1  D=1  D=1 | U=1  D=1 | U=0  U=1| D=1  D=1,U=0  D=0 | U=1 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
All workers  0.39  0.50  0.87  0.25  0.69  0.15  0.13 
1.  Socio-Demographic               
Male  0.45  0.53  0.89  0.23  0.76  0.13  0.11 
Female  0.33  0.46  0.85  0.27  0.62  0.18  0.15 
White  0.39  0.49  0.87  0.25  0.70  0.15  0.13 
Non-White/Ethnic  0.42  0.57  0.90  0.35  0.64  0.20  0.10 
Age <25  0.15  0.34  0.81  0.26  0.35  0.22  0.19 
Age 25-29  0.33  0.45  0.87  0.25  0.63  0.17  0.13 
Age 30-39  0.43  0.53  0.88  0.26  0.72  0.15  0.12 
Age 40-49  0.48  0.56  0.88  0.25  0.77  0.13  0.12 
Age 50-59  0.43  0.52  0.87  0.24  0.75  0.14  0.13 
6.00  60+  0.33  0.44  0.88  0.22  0.67  0.15  0.12 
Age 25+  0.43  0.52  0.88  0.25  0.73  0.14  0.12 
Age < 25  0.15  0.34  0.81  0.26  0.35  0.22  0.19 
No education  0.42  0.52  0.90  0.24  0.74  0.14  0.10 
Middle education  0.35  0.49  0.88  0.27  0.64  0.18  0.12 
High education  0.41  0.47  0.83  0.23  0.72  0.14  0.17 
2.  Occupational & Job Related               
Managers & sen.  admin.  0.26  0.28  0.76  0.11  0.70  0.08  0.24 
Professionals  0.51  0.54  0.84  0.24  0.78  0.12  0.16 
Associate prof and tech  0.52  0.57  0.86  0.25  0.79  0.12  0.14 
Clerical and secretarial  0.31  0.45  0.88  0.26  0.61  0.18  0.12 
Craft and skilled service  0.50  0.57  0.91  0.23  0.80  0.12  0.09 
Personal and protective service  0.36  0.49  0.87  0.27  0.65  0.17  0.13 
Sales  0.18  0.38  0.80  0.29  0.37  0.24  0.10 
Operative and assembly  0.55  0.66  0.92  0.32  0.79  0.14  0.08 
Other occupations  0.33  0.49  0.89  0.29  0.61  0.19  0.11 
< £50 pw  0.10  0.30  0.66  0.26  0.23  0.23  0.34 
£51-80 pw  0.18  0.39  0.82  0.30  0.37  0.25  0.18 
£81-140 pw  0.26  0.43  0.86  0.28  0.53  0.21  0.14 
£141-180 pw  0.32  0.49  0.88  0.30  0.59  0.20  0.12 
£181-220 pw  0.43  0.57  0.91  0.31  0.69  0.18  0.09 
£221-260 pw  0.45  0.55  0.91  0.26  0.74  0.14  0.09 
£261-310 pw  0.51  0.56  0.88  0.23  0.80  0.11  0.12 
£311-360 pw  0.54  0.60  0.89  0.26  0.80  0.12  0.11 
£361-430 pw  0.60  0.63  0.91  0.22  0.86  0.09  0.09 
£431-540 pw  0.51  0.52  0.83  0.19  0.83  0.09  0.17 
£541-680 pw  0.45  0.44  0.83  0.11  0.86  0.06  0.17 
£681+ pw  0.29  0.25  0.71  0.06  0.83  0.04  0.29 
Pay low  0.20  0.39  0.82  0.28  0.43  0.22  0.18 
Pay mid  0.47  0.57  0.90  0.27  0.75  0.14  0.10 
Pay high  0.45  0.44  0.81  0.13  0.83  0.07  0.19 
WP tenure <2 yrs  0.21  0.38  0.82  0.26  0.47  0.21  0.18 
WP tenure 2 <5  0.33  0.47  0.86  0.27  0.62  0.18  0.14 
WP tenure 5 <10  0.44  0.53  0.88  0.25  0.73  0.14  0.12 
WP tenure 10+  0.60  0.63  0.90  0.22  0.86  0.09  0.10 
WP tenure > 5 yrs  0.46  0.55  0.88  0.25  0.76  0.14  0.12 
WP tenure <5yrs  0.21  0.38  0.82  0.26  0.47  0.21  0.18 
[cont’d]  U=1  D=1   D=1 | U=1  D=1 | U=0  U=1| D=1  D=1,U=0  D=0 | U=1 
< 10 hrs  0.16  0.37  0.81  0.28  0.36  0.24  0.19 
10-29 hrs  0.27  0.44  0.84  0.29  0.52  0.21  0.16 
 30-39 hrs  0.49  0.59  0.90  0.30  0.74  0.15  0.10 29 
40-47 hrs  0.41  0.48  0.88  0.21  0.75  0.12  0.12 
> 48 hrs  0.42  0.47  0.85  0.19  0.77  0.11  0.15 
Part time  0.38  0.52  0.88  0.29  0.65  0.18  0.12 
Full time  0.41  0.48  0.87  0.20  0.75  0.12  0.13 
3.  Workplace and Industry               
Non-independent workplace  0.44  0.55  0.89  0.28  0.72  0.16  0.11 
Single-ind workplace  0.20  0.30  0.76  0.18  0.53  0.14  0.24 
10 - 24 employees  0.22  0.32  0.80  0.18  0.57  0.14  0.20 
25 - 49 employees  0.23  0.35  0.82  0.21  0.54  0.16  0.18 
50 - 99 employees  0.30  0.42  0.87  0.22  0.63  0.15  0.13 
100 - 199 employees  0.39  0.49  0.87  0.25  0.69  0.15  0.13 
200 - 499 employees  0.47  0.58  0.88  0.32  0.71  0.17  0.12 
500 >  0.57  0.67  0.91  0.34  0.79  0.15  0.09 
Private sector  0.29  0.40  0.86  0.21  0.62  0.15  0.14 
Public sector  0.62  0.72  0.89  0.42  0.78  0.16  0.11 
No union present  0.09  0.22  0.65  0.18  0.26  0.16  0.35 
Union present  0.61  0.69  0.90  0.37  0.79  0.14  0.10 
Age of Establishment               
< 3 yrs  0.28  0.39  0.87  0.21  0.61  0.15  0.13 
3 - 4 yrs  0.34  0.48  0.88  0.27  0.64  0.18  0.12 
5 - 9 yrs  0.24  0.38  0.84  0.24  0.52  0.18  0.16 
10 - 20 yrs  0.31  0.43  0.85  0.24  0.62  0.17  0.15 
> 20yrs   0.48  0.57  0.88  0.27  0.76  0.14  0.12 
Industry               
Manufacturing  0.45  0.52  0.90  0.21  0.78  0.12  0.10 
Electricity, gas and water  0.72  0.75  0.89  0.37  0.86  0.10  0.11 
Construction  0.34  0.41  0.84  0.19  0.70  0.13  0.16 
Wholesale and retail  0.17  0.35  0.81  0.26  0.39  0.22  0.19 
Hotels and restaurants  0.10  0.24  0.66  0.19  0.28  0.17  0.34 
Transport and communication  0.62  0.69  0.93  0.29  0.84  0.11  0.07 
Financial services  0.40  0.50  0.84  0.27  0.67  0.16  0.16 
Other business services  0.11  0.22  0.81  0.15  0.40  0.13  0.19 
Public administration  0.67  0.75  0.88  0.49  0.79  0.16  0.12 
Education  0.45  0.54  0.84  0.28  0.72  0.15  0.16 
Health  0.48  0.60  0.88  0.34  0.72  0.18  0.12 
Other comm.  services  0.28  0.42  0.85  0.24  0.58  0.17  0.15 
4.  Geographical Segments               
East Anglia  0.32  0.46  0.84  0.27  0.61  0.18  0.16 
East Midlands  0.36  0.46  0.87  0.23  0.69  0.15  0.13 
London  0.35  0.45  0.85  0.23  0.67  0.15  0.15 
North  0.57  0.65  0.90  0.32  0.79  0.14  0.10 
North West  0.47  0.56  0.87  0.27  0.74  0.14  0.13 
Scotland  0.48  0.59  0.90  0.29  0.75  0.15  0.10 
Rest of the South East  0.26  0.38  0.83  0.22  0.58  0.16  0.17 
South West  0.37  0.49  0.88  0.26  0.67  0.16  0.12 
Wales  0.45  0.59  0.87  0.35  0.68  0.19  0.13 
West Midlands  0.43  0.52  0.87  0.25  0.72  0.14  0.13 
Yorkshire & Humberside  0.38  0.49  0.90  0.24  0.70  0.15  0.10 
 
Note:  See text for formulas.  Based on samples derived from WERS 1998.  Samples are 
representative of individuals employed in workplaces with 10+ employees in Britain. 30 
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Table:  Union Membership Models Conditional on All Segments and Other Controls 
    Dependent variable: Union Membership Status 
  Mean  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
[Male]               
Female  0.49  -0.02 (-1.02)  -0.1 (–0.62)  -0.02 (–1.08)  -0.02 (–1.19)  -0.13 (–0.91)  -0.02 (–1.03) 
               
[Age <25]               
Age 25-29  0.13  0.05 (2.38)  0.07 (2.54)  0.05 (2.28)  0.06 (2.55)  0.06 (2.37)  0.05 (2.34) 
Age 30-39  0.27  0.09 (4.06)  0.11 (4.30)  0.09 (4.13)  0.10 (4.44)  0.10 (4.35)  0.09 (4.08) 
Age 40-49  0.25  0.10 (4.52)  0.12 (4.48)  0.10 (4.40)  0.11 (4.73)       0.11 (4.75)  0.11 (4.54) 
Age 50-59  0.18  0.06 (2.52)  0.06 (2.07)  0.06 (2.46)  0.07 (2.92)  0.07 (2.88)  0.06 (2.51) 
Age 60+  0.04  0.01 (0.17)  0.00 (–0.05)  0.01 (0.20)  0.02 (0.57)  0.02 (0.60)  0.01 (0.21) 
                 
[Low education]               
Middle education  0.41  -0.04 (–3.18)  -0.06 (–3.51)  -0.04 (–3.17)  -0.05 (–3.24)  -0.04 (–2.99)  -0.04 (–3.14) 
High education  0.21  -0.03 (–1.37)  -0.05 (–1.78)  -0.03 (–1.30)  -0.03 (–1.40)  -0.03 (–1.14)  -0.03 (–1.36) 
                 
[White]               
Ethnic  0.40  0.03 (1.14)  0.05 (1.67)  0.04 (1.26)  0.03 (1.13)  0.04 (1.18)  0.03 (1.00) 
               
Manager  0.09  -0.43 (–11.87)  -0.48 (–12.14)  -0.43 (–11.92)  -0.43 (–11.21)    -0.43 (–11.96)  -0.43 (–11.87) 
Prof.  0.11  -0.21 (–6.08)  -0.23 (–5.98)  -0.21 (–6.04)  -0.21 (–5.82)  -0.21 (–6.00)  -0.21 (–6.12) 
Asst.  Prof.  0.08  -0.21 (-6.55)  -0.23 (–6.33)  -0.21 (–6.43)  -0.20 (–6.12)  -0.21 (–6.53)  -0.21 (–6.60) 
Clerical   0.18  -0.34 (-11.23)  -0.37 (–11.07)  -0.34 (–11.25)  -0.33 (–10.79)  -0.34 (–11.44)  -0.34 (–11.20) 
Craft  0.10  -0.07 (-2.65)  -0.07 (–2.44)  -0.07 (–2.70)  -0.06 (–2.53)  -0.06 (–2.53)  -0.07 (–2.67) 
Personal  0.12  -0.23 (-6.52)  -0.24 (–6.16)  -0.23 (–6.58)  -0.23 (–6.54)  -0.23 (–6.35)  -0.23 (–6.55) 
Sales  0.09  -0.14 (-4.12)  -0.15 (–4.19)  -0.13 (–4.07)  -0.14 (–4.12)  -0.14 (–4.17)  -0.14 (–4.14) 
[Operative]               
Other Occup.  0.10  -0.14 (-5.38)  -0.15 (–4.89)  -0.14 (–5.13)  -0.14 (–5.43)  -0.14 (–5.32)  -0.14 (–5.38) 
                 
[WP ten.  < 2]               
WP ten.  2-4  0.23  0.07 (4.64)  0.07 (4.13)  0.07 (4.80)  0.06 (4.31)  0.07 (4.76)  0.07 (4.67) 
WP ten.  5-9  0.22  0.14 (8.63)  0.15 (7.90)  0.14 (8.59)  0.14 (8.36)  0.15 (8.76)  0.14 (8.63) 
WP ten.  > 10  0.26  0.24 (14.06)  0.26 (13.66)  0.24 (14.12)  0.24 (13.65)  0.24 (14.12)  0.24 (14.05) 
                 
Hrs.  < 10   0.05  -0.01 (–0.12)  0.01 (0.08)  -0.01 (–0.21)  0.00 (–0.02)  0.00  (0.05)  -0.01 (–0.11) 
Hrs.  10-29  0.22  0.03 (1.51)  0.02 (0.88)  0.03 (1.31)  0.03 (1.44)  0.03 (1.32)  0.04 (1.59) 
[Hrs.  30-39]                 
Hrs.  40-47  0.27  -0.06 (–3.64)  -0.06 (–3.53)  -0.05 (–3.39)   -0.05 (–3.29)  -0.06 (–3.57)  -0.06 (–3.69)  
Hrs.  > 47  0.15  -0.03 (–1.34)  -0.04 (–1.31)  -0.03 (–1.27)  -0.03 (–1.35)  -0.03 (–1.10)  -0.03 (–1.33) 
                
GW < 50  0.08  -0.36 (–7.72)  -0.34 (–6.90)  -0.36 (–7.99)  -0.35 (–7.37)  -0.34 (–7.43)  -0.36 (–7.72) 
GW 51-80  0.07  -0.23 (–5.81)  -0.22 (–5.08)  -0.23 (–5.79)  -0.22 (–5.62)  -0.23 (–5.69)  -0.23 (–5.86) 
GW 81-140  0.13  -0.15 (–6.93)  -0.15 (–6.08)  -0.15 (–6.94)  -0.14 (–6.45)  -0.15 (–6.82)  -0.15 (–7.20) 
[GW 140-220]                   
GW 221-260  0.10  0.05 (2.63)  0.06 (2.77)  0.05 (2.63)  0.05 (2.47)  0.04 (2.37)  0.05 (2.58) 
GW 261-310  0.10  0.11 (5.50)  0.12 (5.25)  0.12 (5.58)  0.11 (5.41)  0.10 (5.11)  0.11 (5.42) 
GW 311-360  0.08  0.15 (5.90)  0.15 (5.68)  0.15 (5.99)  0.15 (5.86)  0.14 (5.45)  0.15 (5.76) 
GW 361-430  0.10  0.20 (6.60)  0.21 (6.08)  0.20 (6.83)  0.19 (6.80)  0.19 (6.50)  0.20 (7.00) 
GW 431-540  0.07  0.16 (5.07)  0.16 (4.83)  0.16 (5.11)  0.15 (5.00)  0.14 (4.62)  0.15 (5.05) 
GW 541-680  0.04  0.19 (5.04)  0.19 (4.51)  0.19 (5.00)  0.18 (4.93)  0.17 (4.55)  0.19 (5.01) 
GW >681  0.03  0.10 (2.13)  0.12 (2.42)  0.10 (2.22)  0.09 (2.03)  0.08 (1.75)  0.09 (2.13) 
                 
[Size < 10]                 
Size 10-24  0.13  0.06 (1.36)  0.06 (1.34)  0.06 (1.62)  0.07 (1.68)  0.06 (1.47)  0.07 (1.75) 
Size 25-49  0.14  -0.06 (–2.28)  -0.06 (–2.24)  -0.05 (–1.73)  -0.05 (–1.97)  -0.07 (–2.41)  -0.05 (–1.81) 
Size 50-99  0.15  -0.01 (–0.45)  -0.01 (–0.48)  0.00 (0.11)  -0.01 (–0.23)  -0.02 (–0.74)  0.00 (–0.10) 
Size 100-199  0.15  -0.02 (-0.81)  -0.02 (–0.63)  -0.01 (–0.41)  -0.03 (–1.06)  -0.02 (–0.79)  -0.02 (–0.58) 
Size 200-499  0.20  0.05 (1.78)  0.05 (1.95)  0.06 (2.24)  0.04 (1.81)  0.04 (1.51)  0.05 (1.91) 
                 
[Part of larger org.]               
Single   0.22  -0.11 (–5.01)  -0.11 (–4.96)  -0.09 (–4.25)  -0.08 (–3.48)  -0.11 (–5.20)   -0.10 (–4.83) 
               
[Private/other]               
Public  0.31  0.16 (5.65)  0.15 (5.25)  0.14 (4.69)  0.14 (5.06)  0.16 (5.57)  0.16 (5.64) 
               
[Manufacturing]               
Utility  0.01  0.22 (5.23)  0.24 (5.65)  0.21 (4.77)  0.21 (4.72)  0.22 (5.05)  0.23 (5.29) 
Construction  0.03  -0.05 (–1.15)  -0.04 (–0.94)  -0.04 (–0.90)  -0.02 (–0.52)  -0.05 (–1.11)  -0.04 (–1.08) 31 
[cont’d]  Mean  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
Distribution  0.15  0.05 (1.49)  0.05 (1.34)  0.04 (1.24)  0.03 (0.86)  0.04 (1.18)  0.06 (1.61) 
Hotel / Res.  0.04  0.06 (0.98)  0.06 (0.95)  0.07 (1.06)  0.04 (0.67)  0.05 (0.81)  0.07 (1.01) 
Trans / Comm.  0.06  0.23 (6.41)  0.25 (6.51)  0.23 (6.16)  0.22 (6.08)  0.23 (6.32)  0.24 (6.38) 
Fin.  Services  0.04  0.23 (4.83)  0.24 (5.01)  0.23 (4.87)  0.18 (3.83)  0.23 (4.84)  0.22 (4.57) 
Bus.  Services  0.08  -0.07 (–1.71)  -0.06 (–1.40)  -0.07 (–1.72)  -0.08 (–1.90)  -0.07 (–1.67)  -0.06 (–1.55) 
Public Adm.  0.09  0.12 (2.87)  0.13 (2.98)  0.11 (2.55)  0.12 (2.74)  0.14 (3.15)  0.13 (2.91) 
Education  0.10  0.12 (2.87)  0.14 (3.00)  0.10 (2.28)  0.11 (2.50)  0.11 (2.64)  0.13 (2.89) 
Health  0.13  0.14 (3.41)  0.15 (3.42)  0.13 (3.01)  0.13 (3.34)  0.14 (3.40)  0.14 (3.44) 
Other Service  0.03  0.05 (1.10)  0.04 (0.83)  0.04 (0.87)  0.05 (1.03)  0.04 (0.96)  0.05 (1.19) 
                 
Workplace < 3 yrs  0.08  -0.06 (–1.66)  -0.06 (–1.67)  -0.05 (–1.68)  -0.05 (–1.59)  -0.06 (–1.62)  -0.05 (–1.59) 
Workplace 3-4 yrs  0.07  0.00 (0.03)  -0.01 (–0.32)  0.00 (0.04)  0.00 (–0.07)  0.03 (0.74)  0.00 (0.10) 
Workplace 5-9 yrs  0.14  -0.02 (–0.68)  -0.03 (–0.88)  -0.01 (–0.39)  -0.02 (–0.75)  -0.02 (–0.62)  -0.01 (–0.47) 
W’place 10-20 yrs  0.20  -0.05 (–2.26)  -0.05 (–2.25)  -0.05 (–2.23)  -0.04 (–2.06)  -0.05 (–2.31)  -0.04 (–2.06) 
[W’place>20 yrs]                  
               
E.  Anglia  0.05  0.01 (0.20)  0.01 (0.20)  0.01 (0.17)  0.00 (–0.06)  0.04 (0.61)  0.02 (0.25) 
E.  Midlands  0.09  0.10 (3.22)  0.10 (3.17)  0.11 (3.58)  0.08 (2.75)  0.09 (3.10)  0.10 (3.21) 
London  0.10  0.06 (2.24)  0.07 (2.55)  0.06 (2.35)  0.06 (2.27)  0.07 (2.52)  0.06 (2.29) 
[Rest of SE]               
North  0.07  0.18 (4.71)  0.20 (4.57)   0.17 (4.80)  0.18 (4.89)  0.20 (5.26)  0.17 (4.43) 
Northwest  0.10  0.17 (5.23)  0.17 (4.79)  0.17 (5.03)  0.17 (4.90)  0.17 (5.25)  0.17 (5.13) 
Scotland  0.10  0.08 (3.00)  0.08 (2.75)  0.07 (2.61)  0.09 (3.11)  0.09 (3.30)  0.08 (3.10) 
Southwest  0.08  0.08 (2.03)  0.07 (1.93)  0.08 (2.14)  0.07 (1.97)  0.08 (2.03)  0.08 (2.02) 
Wales  0.04  0.09 (1.89)  0.10 (1.92)  0.10 (2.28)  0.09 (2.00)  0.08 (1.76)  0.09 (1.93) 
West Midlands  0.10  0.09 (2.58)  0.09 (2.33)  0.10 (2.81)  0.08 (2.47)  0.09 (2.58)  0.09 (2.68) 
Yorks/Humber.  0.08  0.12 (3.83)  0.12 (3.48)  0.11 (3.40)  0.13 (4.01)  0.12 (3.72)  0.12 (3.78) 
                  
[No recog.  Union]               
Union Recog.  0.58  0.40 (17.22)  0.40 (16.38)  0.35 (13.72)  0.39 (16.94)  0.39 (17.19)  0.40 (17.04) 
[No strategic plan]               
Strategy   0.85        -0.01 (–0.33)     
[Not IiP accredited]               
Award  0.35        0.07 (3.90)     
[No written equal ops 
policy] 
             
Written Policy  0.81        0.07 (2.59)     
[No griev.  Proc.]               
Grievance Proc.  0.96        0.10 (1.65)     
In favour  0.18    0.17 (11.01)         
[Neutral]                
Not in favour  0.28    -0.04 (–2.65)         
Other  0.01    -0.21 (–2.16)          
In favour  0.38      0.22 (5.31)       
[Not in favour]               
Neutral  0.49      0.12 (3.22)       
Not at issue  0.02      -0.12 (–0.84)       
Other  0.00             
[Low HRM score]               
HRM High  0.50          -0.01 (–0.66)   
[No quality circle]               
Quality  circle  .051          0.01 (0.72)   
[No team briefing]               
Team briefing  .054          0.04 (2.43)   
[No reg.  Meeting]               
Reg.  Meetings  .035          0.01 (0.65)   
[No non-union 
collective.  Rep.] 
             
Non-union collective 
representation 
.043            0.02 (1.16) 
[No Euro WC in UK]               
Euro WC in UK  .009            0.04 (0.96) 
 
Notes:  Based on data derived from WERS 1998.  Coefficients are marginal effects at means 
of independent variables in the estimation sample.  T-stats in parentheses. 
 
 
 32 
(Available Upon Request) 
 
Table:  Models of Desired Union Voice in WERS 1998 
 
  Dependent variable: Desired Union Membership 
  Mean  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
[Male]                 
Female  0.49  -0.03 (–2.09)  -0.02 (–1.27)  -0.04 (–2.19)  -0.03 (–2.00)  -0.04 (–2.22)  -0.03 (–2.08)  -0.03 (–1.91) 
                 
[Age <25]                 
Age 25-29  0.13  -0.02 (–0.71)  -0.01 (–0.54)  -0.02 (–0.78)  -0.02 (–0.79)  -0.02 (–0.91)  -0.02 (–0.73)  -0.02 (–0.82) 
Age 30-39  0.27  -0.03 (–1.42)  -0.03 (–1.22)  -0.03 (–1.48)  -0.04 (–1.69)  -0.04 (–1.50)  -0.03 (–1.44)  -0.04 (–1.60) 
Age 40-49  0.25  -0.04 (–1.50)  -0.03 (–1.30)  -0.04 (–1.58)  -0.04 (–1.61)  -0.04  (1.48)  -0.04 (–1.49)  -0.04 (–1.57) 
Age 50-59  0.18  -0.07 (–2.60)  -0.07 (–2.39)  -0.07 (–2.66)  -0.07 (–2.70)  -0.07 (–2.51)  -0.07 (–2.60)  -0.07 (–2.66) 
Age 60+  0.04  -0.13 (–3.41)  -0.11 (–2.97)  -0.13 (–3.52)  -0.13 (–3.38)  -0.13 (–3.40)  -0.13 (–3.39)  -0.12 (–3.24) 
[Quality low]                 
Quality mid  0.41  0.05 (3.29)  0.05 (3.36)  0.05 (3.37)  0.04 (2.79)  0.05 (3.06)  0.05 (3.29)  0.05 (3.46) 
Quality high  0.21  0.07 (3.23)  0.08 (3.63)  0.07 (3.29)  0.07 (2.91)  0.07 (3.07)  0.07 (3.21)  0.08 (3.49) 
[White]                 
Ethnic  0.04  0.09 (2.82)  0.10 (2.60)  0.10 (2.85)  0.09 (2.68)  0.09 (2.74)  0.10 (2.91)  0.09 (2.57) 
[Never Memb]                 
Ex Member  0.18  0.18 (12.74)  0.16 (11.18)  0.18 (12.41)  0.18 (12.44)  0.18 (12.63)  0.18 (12.74)  0.18 (12.17) 
Member  0.39  0.60 (40.19)  0.58 (37.53)  0.59 (39.58)  0.59 (39.10)  0.59 (39.66)  0.60 (40.17)  0.58 (37.12) 
                 
Manager  0.09  -0.31 (–9.34)  -0.33 (–9.94)  -0.31 (–9.36)  -0.32 (–9.31)      -0.31 (–9.34)  -0.31 (–9.29)  -0.33 (–9.46) 
Prof.  0.11  -0.19 (–5.00)  -0.21 (–5.74)  -0.19 (–5.00)  -0.20 (–5.05)   -5.12 (–0.20)  -0.19 (–4.99)  -0.20 (–5.04) 
Asst.  Prof.  0.08  -0.25 (–7.08)  -0.25 (–7.15)  -0.24 (–7.07)  -0.25 (–6.96)  -0.24 (–6.97)  -0.25 (–7.03)  -0.26 (–7.18) 
Clerical   0.18  -0.20 (–7.28)  -0.22 (–7.83)  -0.20 (–7.31)  -0.20 (–7.14)  -0.20 (–7.20)  -0.20 (–7.29)  -0.21 (–7.47) 
Craft  0.10  -0.07 (–2.43)  -0.07 (–2.50)  -0.07 (–2.47)  -0.07 (–2.47)  -0.07 (–2.37)  -0.07 (–2.50)  -0.07 (–2.56) 
Personal  0.12  -0.16 (–4.33)  -0.16 (–4.28)  -0.16 (–4.39)  -0.17 (–4.57)  -0.16 (–4.25)  -0.16 (–4.30)  -0.16 (–4.48) 
Sales  0.09  -0.08 (–2.48)  -0.09 (–2.71)  -0.08 (–2.53)  -0.10 (–2.93)  -0.09 (–2.57)  -0.08 (–2.48)  -0.09 (–2.57) 
Other Occup.  0.10  -0.10 (–3.27)  -0.09 (–3.10)  -0.10 (–3.26)  -0.10 (–3.29)  -0.11 (–3.50)  -0.10 (–3.28)  -0.11 (–3.48) 
                   
[WP ten.  < 2]                 
WP ten.  2-4  0.23  0.02 (1.12)  0.01 (0.79)  0.02 (1.22)  0.01 (0.58)  0.02 (1.23)  0.02 (1.16)  0.02 (1.29) 
WP ten.  5-9  0.22  0.02 (0.98)  0.01 (0.77)  0.02 (0.96)  0.01 (0.59)  0.02 (1.12)  0.02 (0.95)  0.02 (1.08) 
WP ten.  > 10  0.26  0.02 (0.74)  0.01 (0.50)  0.02 (0.77)  0.01 (0.36)  0.02 (0.78)  0.01 (0.71)  0.02 (0.90) 
                   
Hrs.  < 10   0.05  0.01 (0.28)  0.01 (0.11)  0.01 (0.17)   0.02 (0.33)  0.01 (0.29)  0.01 (0.28)  0.01 (0.19) 
Hrs.  10-29  0.22  -0.02 (–0.92)  -0.04 (–1.72)  -0.02 (–1.00)  -0.02 (–0.78)  -0.03 (–1.11)  -0.02 (–0.91)  -0.02 (–1.03) 
[Hrs.  30-39]                 
Hrs.  40-47  0.27  -0.05 (–3.12)  -0.05 (–3.15)  -0.05 (–2.95)  -0.04 (–2.83)  -0.05 (–3.22)  -0.05 (–3.04)  -0.05 (–2.93) 
Hrs.  > 47  0.15  -0.05 (–2.49)  -0.06 (–2.60)  -0.05 (–2.47)  -0.05 (–2.43)  -0.05 (–2.50)  -0.05 (–2.43)  -0.05 (–2.32) 
                 
GW < 50  0.08  -0.07 (–1.62)  -0.03 (–0.67)  -0.07 (–1.72)  -0.07 (–1.76)  -0.06 (–1.43)  -0.07 (–1.61)  -0.07 (–1.64) 
GW 51-80  0.07  -0.01 (–0.40)  0.00 (–0.11)  -0.01 (–0.34)  -0.03 (–0.69)  -0.02 (–0.51)  -0.01 (–0.40)  -0.02 (–0.42) 
GW 81-140  0.13  -0.04 (–1.57)  -0.03 (–1.38)  -0.04 (–1.60)  -0.04 (–1.71)  -0.03 (–1.48)  -0.04 (–1.56)  -0.04 (–1.50) 
[GW 140-220]                 
GW 221-260  0.10  -0.04 (–1.91)  -0.03 (–1.56)  -0.04 (–1.88)  -0.04 (–1.98)  -0.04 (–2.09)  -0.04 (–1.92)  -0.05 (–2.21) 
GW 261-310  0.10  -0.07 (–3.15)  -0.08 (–3.31)  -0.07 (–3.09)  -0.06 (–2.90)  -0.07 (–3.01)  -0.07 (–3.21)  -0.08 (–3.38) 
GW 311-360  0.08  -0.04 (–1.23)  -0.03 (–1.00)  -0.04 (–1.25)  -0.03 (–1.00)  -0.03 (–1.14)  -0.04 (–1.27)  -0.03 (–1.15) 
GW 361-430  0.10  -0.04 (–1.37)  -0.04 (–1.48)  -0.04 (–1.37)  -0.03 (–1.02)  -0.04 (–1.33)  -0.04 (–1.44)  -0.04 (–1.37) 
GW 431-540  0.07  -0.14 (–4.39)  -0.14 (–4.60)  -0.13 (–4.30)  -0.13 (–4.04)  -0.13 (–4.20)  -0.14 (–4.40)  -0.15 (–4.55) 
GW 541-680  0.04  -0.16 (–4.16)  -0.17 (–4.27)  -0.16 (–4.26)  -0.15 (–4.02)  -0.16 (–4.12)  -0.16 (–4.30)  -0.17 (–4.25) 
GW >681  0.03  -0.32 (–5.92)  -0.31 (–5.61)  -0.31 (–5.92)  -0.31 (–5.80)  -0.32 (–5.87)  -0.32 (–6.02)  -0.32 (–5.88) 
[Size < 10]                 
Size 10-24  0.13  -0.14 (–4.40)  -0.15 (–4.53)  -0.14 (–4.36)  -0.12 (–3.63)  -0.13 (–3.96)  -0.14 (–4.14)  -0.13 (–4.00) 
Size 25-49  0.14  -0.12 (–4.22)  -0.13 (–4.43)  -0.11 (–4.04)  -0.10 (–3.35)  -0.12 (–4.02)  -0.11 (–3.94)  -0.11 (–3.73) 
Size 50-99  0.15  -0.09 (–3.19)  -0.09 (–3.21)  -0.08 (–3.03)  -0.07 (–2.81)  -0.08 (–2.93)  -0.08 (–3.03)  -0.08 (–2.87) 
Size 100-199  0.15  -0.09 (–3.46)  -0.09 (–3.50)  -0.08 (–3.27)  -0.09 (–3.62)  -0.08 (–3.18)  -0.08 (–3.28)  -0.07 (–2.82) 
Size 200-499  0.20  -0.02 (–0.64)  -0.02 (–0.91)  -0.01 (–0.38)  -0.01 (–0.45)  -0.01 (–0.38)  -0.02 (–0.61)  -0.02 (–0.52) 
[Non-single]                  
Single workpl.  0.22  -0.10 (–5.20)  -0.10 (–5.16)  -0.09 (–4.93)  -0.06 (–3.15)  -0.10 (–5.09)  -0.10 (–5.04)  -0.09 (–4.66) 
[Private]                   
Public  0.31  0.14 (5.05)  0.13 (4.82)  0.12 (4.55)  0.13 (4.91)  0.13 (4.86)  0.14 (5.00)  0.12 (4.39) 
[Manufacturing                 
Utility  0.01  0.11 (3.51)  0.11 (3.76)  0.10 (3.23)  0.10 (3.04)  0.12 (3.57)  0.11 (3.50)  0.11 (3.29) 
Construction  0.03  -0.05 (–1.05)  -0.04 (–0.94)  -0.04 (–1.00)  -0.04 (–0.90)  -0.04 (–0.97)  -0.04 (–1.01)  -0.03 (–0.74) 
Distribution  0.15  0.05 (1.69)  0.04 (1.52)  0.05 (1.72)  0.04 (1.39)  0.05 (1.88)  0.05 (1.70)  0.06 (2.17) 33 
Hotel / Res.  0.04  0.02 (0.40)  0.02 (0.40)  0.02 (0.44)  0.01 (0.15)  0.02 (0.50)  0.01 (0.33)  0.04 (1.02) 
Trans / Comm.  0.06  0.09 (2.56)  0.11 (3.04)  0.10 (2.49)  0.09 (2.65)  0.10 (2.63)  0.09 (2.54)  0.09 (2.31) 
Fin.  Services  0.04  0.08 (2.70)  0.09 (3.03)  0.09 (2.84)  0.07 (2.10)  0.10 (2.96)  0.08 (2.64)  0.09 (2.57) 
[cont’d]  Mean  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
Bus.  Services  0.08  -0.02 (–0.65)  -0.01 (–0.46)  -0.02 (–0.54)  -0.03 (–1.06)  -0.02 (–0.51)  -0.02 (–0.64)  0.00 (–0.04) 
Public Adm.  0.09  0.05 (1.24)  0.05 (1.17)  0.04 (1.12)  0.03 (0.79)  0.05 (1.21)  0.05 (1.24)  0.06 (1.46) 
Education  0.10  0.00 (0.06)  0.01 (0.24)  -0.01 (–0.21)  -0.02 (–0.52)  0.01 (0.16)  0.00 (0.04)  -0.01 (–0.18) 
Health  0.13  0.09 (2.34)  0.10 (2.71)  0.08 (2.16)  0.07 (1.80)  0.09 (2.31)  0.09 (2.33)  0.09 (2.44) 
Other Service  0.03  0.06 (1.42)  0.06 (1.55)  0.06 (1.45)  0.05 (1.27)  0.05 (1.32)  0.06 (1.42)  0.08 (1.97) 
                  
AGWP < 3  0.08  -0.02 (–0.80)  -0.01 (–0.41)  -0.02 (–0.70)  -0.02 (–0.77)  -0.01 (–0.42)  -0.02 (–0.79)  0.00 (0.01) 
AGWP 3-4  0.07  0.02 (0.66)  0.03 (0.79)  0.03 (0.74)  0.03 (0.80)  0.00 (0.06)  0.02 (0.62)  0.04 (1.15) 
AGWP 5-9  0.14  0.03 (1.49)  0.04 (1.89)  0.03 (1.71)  0.03 (1.34)  0.03 (1.49)  0.03 (1.53)  0.04 (1.93) 
AGWP 10-20  0.20  -0.01 (–0.66)  -0.01 (–0.45)  -0.01 (–0.53)  -0.01 (–0.66)  -0.01 (–0.47)  -0.01 (–0.66)  -0.01 (–0.54) 
[AGWP >20]                  
                 
E.  Anglia  0.05  0.04 (1.27)  0.03 (0.93)  0.05 (1.35)  -0.06 (1.50)  0.03 (0.76)  0.04 (1.24)  0.04 (1.21) 
E.  Midlands  0.09  0.00 (0.13)  -0.01 (–0.40)  0.01 (0.36)  0.01 (0.17)  0.00 (–0.11)  0.01 (0.17)  0.00 (–0.06) 
London  0.10  0.04 (1.38)  0.03 (0.95)  0.04 (1.48)  0.04 (1.51)  0.05 (1.77)  0.04 (1.39)  0.05 (1.99) 
North  0.07  0.05 (1.54)  0.04 (1.01)  0.05 (1.49)  0.06 (1.78)  0.04 (1.37)  0.05 (1.52)  0.06 (1.85) 
Northwest  0.10  0.04 (1.76)  0.04 (1.42)  0.05 (1.89)  0.04 (1.50)  0.04 (1.58)  0.04 (1.71)  0.04 (1.32) 
Scotland  0.10  0.03 (0.94)  0.01 (0.35)  0.02 (0.80)  0.02 (0.85)  0.03 (1.07)  0.03 (0.97)  0.02 (0.70) 
Southwest  0.08  0.06 (1.88)  0.04 (1.31)  0.07 (2.01)  0.06 (1.88)  0.06 (1.89)  0.06 (1.87)  0.05 (1.60) 
Wales  0.04  0.06 (1.78)  0.03 (1.10)  0.06 (2.02)  0.06 (2.02)  0.06 (1.80)  0.06 (1.81)  0.06 (1.83) 
West Midlands  0.10  0.04 (1.16)  0.02 (0.75)  0.04 (1.27)  0.04 (1.39)  0.05 (1.42)  0.04 (1.16)  0.04 (1.22) 
Yorkshire / 
Humberside 
0.08  0.06 (2.38)  0.05 (1.87)  0.06 (2.25)  0.08 (2.89)  0.07 (2.56)  0.06 (2.37)  0.06 (2.11) 
                  
Strategy   0.85        0.00 (–0.15)       
                 
Award  0.35        0.03 (1.78)       
                 
Written Policy  0.81        0.06 (2.50)       
                 
Grievance Proc.  0.96        0.16 (3.74)       
                 
Union Recog.  0.58  0.17 (9.39)  0.16 (8.53)  0.14 (7.31)  0.16 (8.55)  0.18 (9.70)  0.17 (9.36)  0.11 (3.81) 
                 
Ic4__1  0.18    0.15 (7.95)            
[Ic4__2]                 
Ic4__3  0.28    0.04 (2.26)           
Ic4__7  0.01    -0.24 (–2.57)           
                 
Eview__1  0.38      0.10 (3.41)         
[Eview__2]                  
Eview__3  0.49      0.04 (1.62)         
Eview__5  0.02      -0.10 (–1.01)         
Eview__6  0.00               
                 
HRM High  0.50          -0.01 (–0.45)     
                 
Q Circles  0.51          -0.01 (–0.38)     
                 
T Brief 3  0.54          0.02 (1.13)     
                 
Reg.  Meetings  0.35          0.02 (1.19)     
                 
NONUCOLR  0.43            0.01 (0.43)   
                 
Euro WCUK  0.09            0.01 (0.41)   
                 
[30%+density]                 
0%                -0.13 (–4.09) 
1-9%                -0.11 (–3.59) 
10-29%                -0.06 (–2.76) 
 
Notes:  Based on data derived from WERS 1998.  Coefficients are marginal effects at means 
of independent variables in the estimation sample.  T-stats in parentheses.34 
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